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THE RESPONSIBLE GUN OWNERSHIP
ORDINANCE AND NOVEL TEXTUAL
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
Owen McGovern*
Although gun ownership is a fundamental right under the Second
Amendment of the Constitution,1 it is subject to reasonable restrictions.2
The City of Chicago’s most recent attempt to define the contours of those
restrictions raises serious textual questions about the meaning of the
Second Amendment. This Comment will evaluate various provisions of
Chicago’s new firearm ordinance and conclude (1) that it is likely
unconstitutional and (2) that future gun-control regulations will only be
upheld if they respect the full understanding of the contours of the Second
Amendment adopted in Heller, rather than merely satisfying its narrow
holding.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of District of Columbia v. Heller3 and McDonald v. City of
Chicago,4 the City of Chicago promptly amended the Responsible Gun
Ownership Ordinance (the Ordinance) to further its interest in protecting the
public welfare and safety.5 The Ordinance immediately generated federal

*

J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2012.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010).
2
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (listing reasonable
restrictions, such as “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms”).
3
554 U.S. 570.
4
130 S. Ct. 3020.
5
Chi., Ill., Responsible Gun Ownership Ordinance (July 2, 2010) (codified in scattered
sections of CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE (2010)).
1
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lawsuits alleging that several provisions violate fundamental rights under
the Second Amendment.6 The Second Amendment provides:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
7
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

The Chicago Ordinance is particularly worthy of evaluation for three
reasons. First, now that the Second Amendment has been incorporated
against the states,8 these suits are the first in the wave of gun-control
litigation that has been predicted since Heller was decided.9 Second, the
new Ordinance replaced the provisions struck down in McDonald,
rendering it particularly relevant for evaluating the implications of that
decision.10 And third, the Ordinance—as originally amended11—contained
several provisions that implicate previously unexamined limits to the text of
the Second Amendment.
Until recently, scholarship has focused on whether the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms and whether that
right is incorporated against the states.12 As those questions have now been
resolved in favor of an individual right and incorporation, states are left
scrambling to define the line between a legitimate exercise of their police
power and infringement on the fundamental rights of their citizens. The
new Ordinance is a highly visible example of this kind of legislation. A
textual analysis13 of the rights protected by the Second Amendment in this
context may be beneficial in providing guidance to other states as they seek
an understanding of the appropriate reach of the police power.
6

See Complaint, Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 10–3525);
Benson v. City of Chicago, No. 1:10-cv-04184, 2010 WL 2796263 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 6, 2010).
7
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
8
See generally McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020.
9
Linda Greenhouse, D.C. Ban Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2008, at A1.
10
See Chi., Ill., Responsible Gun Ownership Ordinance (stating that the Ordinance was
amended in light of McDonald and Heller).
11
In response to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Ezell, which affirmed the grant of a
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of provisions forbidding firing ranges within
the city limits, Ezell, 651 F.3d at 711, the City of Chicago amended CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE
§ 8-20-280 to allow for firearm training within the city. Coun. J. 7-6-11, p. 3073, § 4
(repealing § 8-20-280, which prohibited shooting galleries and target ranges). However,
since this Comment aims to help other legislatures understand the scope of the Second
Amendment after Heller, it will address the statute as it was initially enacted and explain
why such provisions were contrary to the Amendment’s purpose.
12
See, e.g., CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE STATE (1994);
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED (Indep. Inst., 2d ed. 1994) (1984).
13
Legislatures will most benefit from a textual analysis because this is the analysis used
by the Supreme Court. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (insisting that “the scope of the
Second Amendment right” is determined by textual and historical inquiry, not by interestbalancing).
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In Heller, the Court engaged in an in-depth analysis of the meaning of
the Second Amendment and answered a number of the preliminary
questions needed to evaluate these provisions.14 However, many questions
remain unanswered. Part II of this Comment will summarize the Heller
decision, highlighting the conclusions reached and emphasizing the
questions that remain unanswered. It will also briefly recap McDonald,
which incorporated the Second Amendment against the states, and highlight
the points the Court found particularly important in both decisions. Part III
will attempt to use the original understanding of the text of the Second
Amendment to answer key questions left open by Heller. It will then apply
those answers to the new Ordinance to evaluate how the provisions will fare
under constitutional scrutiny. Finally, Part IV will put the analysis in a
broader context, focusing on the implications for legislatures attempting to
regulate firearms after Heller and McDonald and identifying which
concerns must be respected as central to effective exercise of the Second
Amendment right.
This Comment will conclude that the recently enacted Responsible
Gun Ownership Ordinance is likely unconstitutional, as it fails to respect
the activities protected by the Second Amendment and intrudes upon
concerns that were central to the Amendment’s adoption.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER

In Heller, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the meaning of the
Second Amendment15 and determined that it “guarantee[s] the individual
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”16 This
conclusion resolved the longstanding debate over whether the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right, or whether “the right of the
people” was premised upon membership in a militia.17
The determination that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right and the reasoning in support of that conclusion have significant
implications for the meaning of the provisions within the Second
Amendment. These provisions, in turn, are essential to understanding the
scope of the Second Amendment’s protection and evaluating the
constitutionality of the Chicago Ordinance and future attempts by
legislators to restrict the right to keep and bear arms. As such, it is
14
15
16
17

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577–603 (2008).
Id.
Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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important to understand precisely what the Supreme Court determined in
Heller, precisely which questions the Court answered, and precisely which
questions were not addressed.
1. The Right of the People
The Court in Heller determined that the phrase, “the right of the
people,” unambiguously referred to an “individual right[], not ‘collective’
rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some
corporate body.”18 This determination was made through reference to other
uses of “the people” in the Constitution, which always refer to an individual
right.19
This understanding has significant implications for the meaning of the
rest of the Amendment, particularly the Militia Clause. Since the “militia”
consisted of “a subset of ‘the people’—those who were male, able bodied,
and within a certain age range,”20 membership in the militia was an inherent
characteristic, not an organizational construct.
This means the
Amendment’s scope reaches beyond the militia context to “all members of
the political community.”21 The majority’s understanding of the Second
Amendment as protecting an individual right is the key difference
underlying its disagreement with the dissent in Heller, and can be seen
throughout the Court’s interpretation of each provision.
2. To Keep and Bear Arms
The Court then addressed the substance of the protected right “to keep
and bear Arms.” Eschewing the dissent’s suggestion that “to keep and bear
Arms” was a term of art,22 the majority opinion addressed the phrase as two
separate actions: to keep arms and to bear arms. Before addressing the
verbs, however, the Court addressed their object: “Arms.”23
i.

The Meaning of “Arms”

The Court in Heller determined that the meaning of the term “Arms”
has not changed since 1791, and “extends . . . to all instruments that
constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of

18

Heller, 554 U.S. at 579.
Id. at 578–80 (“Nowhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to ‘the
people’ refer to anything other than an individual right.”).
20
Id. at 580.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 591 (noting that “[s]tate constitutions of the founding period routinely grouped
multiple (related) guarantees under a singular ‘right’”).
23
Id. at 581.
19
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the founding.”24 The term is not limited to arms used in a military
context,25 but extends to “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or
takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.”26
As used in the Second Amendment, however, the term “Arms” is not
given the maximum scope suggested by its dictionary definition as “any
thing that a man . . . useth . . . to cast at or strike another.”27 Rather, the
term “Arms” has been understood to encompass weapons in the common
usage.28
This common-usage understanding includes handguns but
excludes “dangerous and unusual weapons,” such as M-16 rifles.29 The
Court noted that this restriction on the term “Arms” creates tension with the
concept of a militia capable of effective resistance to tyrannical oppression,
particularly given the capabilities of modern militaries.30 Despite this
tension between the Amendment’s purpose and its practical application, the
Court deferred to the limitation on the meaning of “Arms” adopted in
United States v. Miller,31 which the Court interpreted as holding that “the
Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed
by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”32
While Heller established the form of “Arms” referenced in the Second
Amendment, it did not answer the question of whether “Arms,” as applied
to an individual, refers to the possession of a single weapon for use in his
defense, or multiple weapons, as the plural form of the term “Arms” might
suggest.33 This question will be addressed in Part III.A.
ii. To Keep Arms
After establishing the meaning of “Arms” and its restriction within the
Second Amendment, the Court in Heller then evaluated what it means to
24

Id. at 582.
Id. at 581 (stating that “[s]ervants and labourers shall use bows and arrows on
Sundays, &c. and not bear other arms” to demonstrate that “arms” refers to “weapons that
were not specifically designed for military use” (citing 1 T. CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND
COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY 187 (2d ed. 1771))).
26
Id. (quoting CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 187) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
Id. (quoting CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 187) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28
Id. at 627 (“[T]he sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time.’”
(quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939))).
29
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
30
Id.
31
307 U.S. 174.
32
Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
33
Compare id. at 581 (“any thing that a man wears for his defence” (emphasis added)
(quoting CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 187)), with id. (“[w]eapons of offence” (alteration
in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 106 (4th ed., reprt. 1978) (1773))).
25
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keep arms. “[T]he most natural reading of ‘keep Arms’ in the Second
Amendment is to ‘have weapons.’”34 As the meaning of “Arms” was not
limited to those weapons used for military service, the right to “keep Arms”
was likewise unconnected to an organized fighting force. Rather, “‘[k]eep
arms’ was simply a common way of referring to possessing arms, for
militiamen and everyone else.”35 This is consistent with the Court’s
understanding of the “right of the people” as enshrining an individual right,
as well as historical texts discussing the right to keep arms for individual
defense.36
The question that remains unanswered, however, is whether this right
to keep arms for one’s personal defense allows restrictions on the condition
in which the arms may be kept. Heller established that the District of
Columbia’s requirement “that firearms in the home be rendered and kept
inoperable at all times . . . makes it impossible for citizens to use them for
the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional.”37
The question raised by the Chicago Ordinance—which allows only one
operable firearm in the home at a time—is whether it can require that all
other firearms in a home be rendered inoperable if a single firearm is kept
unlocked and ready for use.38
iii. To Bear Arms
Continuing with the substance of the Second Amendment, the Court
determined that the term “to bear” carried the same meaning at the time of
the Amendment’s adoption that it does today: “to carry.”39 When used in
conjunction with “Arms,” however, the term has a more specific meaning:
carrying arms for the purpose of confrontation.40 As with the term “keep
Arms,” the right to “bear Arms” was not limited to a military context, but
referred to the individual right to “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person
or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and
ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another
person.”41 This definition sharply contrasted with the understanding
34

Id. at 582.
Id. at 583 (citations omitted).
36
Id. at 583 n.7 (citing historical examples of the right to keep arms for individual
defense).
37
Id. at 630.
38
CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040 (2011) (allowing only one operable firearm in the
home).
39
Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40
Id.
41
Id. (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)); see also id.
(stating that “‘bear arms’ was unambiguously used to refer to the carrying of weapons
35
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adopted by the dissent, which gave “bear Arms” an idiomatic meaning: “to
serve as a soldier, do military service, fight.”42 However, the Court rejected
this definition, noting that “if ‘bear arms’ means . . . the carrying of arms
only for military purposes, one simply cannot add ‘for the purpose of killing
game’” to the end of the phrase,43 as was done in an amicus brief filed by
linguistics professors.44
iv. The Full Meaning of “to Keep and Bear Arms”
Putting the individual pieces of the clause “to keep and bear Arms”
together, the Court determined that it “guarantee[s] the individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”45 It further noted that
this individual right predates the Constitution and is not dependent upon the
Bill of Rights or the federal government for its existence.46 The Court
explicitly rejected any connection between the right and public service, as
“it was secured to [the people] as individuals, according to ‘libertarian
political principles,’ not as members of a fighting force.”47
The phrase “to keep and bear Arms” was not a term of art limiting that
right to military service.48 Instead, the core of the right to keep arms and
the right to bear arms was the fundamental right to self-defense, as
“Americans understood the ‘right of self-preservation’ as permitting a
citizen to ‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the intervention of society in his
behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.’”49
Having established “the natural right of resistance and selfpreservation,” and “the right of having and using arms for self-preservation
outside of an organized militia”); id. at 587 n.10 (citing historical usages of “bear Arms”
outside of the militia context).
42
Id. at 586 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43
Id. at 589.
44
Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Barron, et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 24, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) (“We
have reviewed the ‘bear arms’ language in the texts identified by Professor Cornell and
concluded that in four of the five instances of non-military use, the use was expressly
qualified by further language indicating a different meaning (e.g., ‘bear arms in times of
peace’ or ‘bear arms . . . for the purpose of killing game’).”).
45
Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
46
Id. (“[T]he Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a preexisting right [and as] ‘[this] is not a right granted by the Constitution[,] [n]either is it in any
manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.’” (quoting United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876))).
47
Id. at 593 (citations omitted) (noting also that the right “was clearly an individual right,
having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia”).
48
Id. at 591 (“State constitutions of the founding period routinely grouped multiple
(related) guarantees under a singular ‘right.’”).
49
Id. at 595 (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *145 n.42).
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and defence” as the core of the Second Amendment, the Court in Heller
then addressed the Prefatory Clause, “a well regulated Militia,” to ensure
that its interpretation of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” did
not create a conflict within the Amendment.50
3. A Well Regulated Militia, Being Necessary to the Security of a Free State
A Prefatory Clause announces and clarifies the purpose of the
operative portion of the Amendment, but does not expand or limit its
scope.51 The meaning of the prefatory phrase, “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State,” then, does not describe a
limitation on the right to bear arms; rather, it clarifies the purpose of the
right to bear arms. Therefore, understanding the meaning of the prefatory
clause—and through it, the purpose of the Second Amendment—is
essential to legislators who wish to craft limits on this fundamental right
without running afoul of the Constitution.
Citing Miller,52 the Supreme Court in Heller determined that “the
Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the
common defense.”53 This broad meaning of the militia describes an entity
that predates the Constitution and exists independent from congressional
action.54 “Congress is given the power . . . not to create, but to ‘organiz[e]’
[the militia]—and not to organize ‘a’ militia . . . but to organize ‘the’
militia, connoting a body already in existence.”55 The militia was not, as
the petitioners suggested, limited to government-regulated military forces.56
As the Court stated, “[a]lthough we agree . . . that ‘militia’ means the same
thing in Article I and the Second Amendment, we believe that petitioners
identify the wrong thing, namely, the organized militia.”57 The fact that
Congress may create an army or navy58 from members of the militia, or call
forth and organize the militia, does not diminish or alter the composition of
the militia itself.59 As the Court stated, “[a]lthough the militia consists of

50

Id.
Id. at 577–78.
52
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
53
Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
54
See id. at 596.
55
Id. (first alteration in original).
56
Id. (“Petitioners take a seemingly narrower view of the militia, stating that ‘[m]ilitias
are the state- and congressionally-regulated military forces described in the Militia Clauses
(art. I, § 8, cls. 15–16).’” (citations omitted)).
57
Id..
58
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–13).
59
See id.
51
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all able-bodied men, the federally organized militia may consist of a subset
of them.”60
Thus, the modifier “well regulated” does not indicate that this militia is
one controlled by the federal or state government. Instead, “‘wellregulated’ implies nothing more than the imposition of proper discipline
and training,”61 which would be necessary for any group attempting to
secure a free state.
“The phrase ‘security of a free state’ meant ‘security of a free polity,’
not security of each of the several States . . . .”62 While there are many
reasons that a well-regulated militia was “necessary to the security of a free
State,” Heller enumerated three in particular. First, the militia was useful in
“repelling invasions and suppressing insurrections.”63
Second, it
“render[ed] large standing armies unnecessary,”64 which was a major
concern of the founding generation.65 Finally, and perhaps most important
to understanding the scope of the Second Amendment, “when the ablebodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better
able to resist tyranny.”66
In describing the rationale for a well-regulated militia, the Court
placed particular emphasis on the ability of the militia to resist the power of
a potentially tyrannical central government.67 The founders understood the
history of the English right to bear arms and knew that the “way tyrants had
eliminated a militia consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by
banning the militia but simply by taking away the people’s arms, enabling a
select militia or standing army to suppress political opponents.”68 Among
the generation that overthrew British rule through the use of its citizen
militia, “[i]t was understood across the political spectrum that the right
helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to
oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional order broke
down.”69
Viewed in light of the experiences of the founding generation:
60

Id.
Id. at 597.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 597–98.
65
Id. at 598 (“During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the federal government
would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing army or select militia
was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric.”).
66
Id.
67
See id. at 598–99.
68
Id. at 598.
69
Id. at 599.
61
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It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause
announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the
militia. The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only
reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more
important for self-defense and hunting. But the threat that the new Federal
Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the
reason that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written
70
Constitution.

To reaffirm the individual nature of this right over the militia-oriented
understanding, the Court applied the militia understanding to this particular
set of concerns. It concluded that if the Second Amendment guaranteed
only “the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an organized
militia . . . if, that is, the organized militia is the sole institutional
beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the
existence of a ‘citizens’ militia’ as a safeguard against tyranny.”71 This
interpretation “guarantees a select militia of the sort the Stuart kings found
useful, but not the people’s militia that was the concern of the founding
generation.”72
Therefore, Heller’s analysis of the Prefatory Clause is consistent with
the individual rights framework it applies to the rest of the Amendment.
Further, since the Prefatory Clause announces the purpose of the
Amendment, it demonstrates that, at the very least, the right to keep and
bear arms is expressly guaranteed for the purpose of maintaining a wellregulated citizens’ militia.73 The question left unanswered, however, is the
degree of regulation that can be imposed upon this right without interfering
with the ability of the militia to remain “well regulated.”
4. The Holding in Heller, Questions Answered, and Questions Left
Undecided
Despite the Constitution’s command that this right “shall not be
infringed,” the right to keep and bear arms is not unlimited.74 It is “not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever
and for whatever purpose.”75 While the holding in Heller did not clearly
delineate the precise limitations to be placed upon the exercise of this
fundamental right, it did provide some examples of the type of regulation
70

Id.
Id. at 600 (citations omitted).
72
Id.
73
See id. at 577 (explaining that the Prefatory Clause “announces a purpose” of the
Amendment, but “does not limit the [Amendment] grammatically”).
74
Id. at 595 (“Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right
of free speech was not . . . .” (citations omitted)).
75
Id. at 626.
71
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that would be acceptable, such as prohibitions on concealed carry. The
Court noted that the “majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the
question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful
under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”76 It further stated that its
decision would not disturb prohibitions on “the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”77
More informative than what the Court did not strike down, however,
are the characteristics of the D.C. statute that rendered it unconstitutional:
the law “totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the home . . . [and] also
require[d] that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by
a trigger lock at all times, rendering it inoperable.”78
In evaluating these provisions, the Court noted that, even beyond the
need for a well-regulated militia, “the inherent right of self-defense has
been central to the Second Amendment right.”79 Even though the right is
not unlimited, the D.C. law could not stand, as it “amount[ed] to a
prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ [handguns] that is overwhelmingly
chosen by American society for that lawful purpose [self-defense in the
home].”80 This prohibition of an entire class of firearms was found
particularly objectionable in this case, as it even extended “to the home,
where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”81
The Court concluded that “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we
have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home
‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of
one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster.”82 The Court
also found unconstitutional the requirement that any lawful firearms in the
home be rendered inoperable, as it “makes it impossible for citizens to use
them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.”83
Despite striking down the D.C. statute as an unconstitutional violation
of a fundamental right, the Court did not establish the standard of review to
be applied going forward. However, it did explicitly reject rational basis

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id.
Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 628–29 (citations omitted).
Id. at 630.
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review84 and the interest-balancing test suggested in Justice Breyer’s
dissent.85 In rejecting the interest-balancing approach, the Court noted that
“[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood
to have when the people adopted them . . . [and are] the very product of an
interest balancing by the people.”86 The discussion of standard of review
concluded with the Court stating that “whatever else it leaves to future
evaluation, [the Second Amendment] surely elevates above all other
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in
defense of hearth and home.”87
B. MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO

McDonald v. City of Chicago88 dealt with incorporation under the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the meaning of the text, and therefore
added little to the understanding of the meaning of the Second Amendment.
However, it is important to highlight briefly two key elements of the case.
First, McDonald determined that the Second Amendment articulated a
fundamental right, and therefore must be applied uniformly to the federal
government and the states.89 In discussing the fundamental nature of this
right, the Court emphasized that “[i]t cannot be doubted that the right to
bear arms was regarded as a substantive guarantee, not a prohibition that
could be ignored so long as the States legislated in an evenhanded
manner.”90
Like Heller, McDonald acknowledged that the Second Amendment
was codified, in part, because of the fear of a centralized government’s
ability to impose rule over a disarmed populace.91 It further emphasized, as
did Heller, that “self-defense was ‘the central component of the right
itself.’”92

84
Id. at 628 n.27 (“Obviously, [rational basis review] could not be used to evaluate the
extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right . . . .”).
85
Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Thus, any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny
to gun regulations will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests
protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety
concerns on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly
burdens the former in the course of advancing the latter. I would simply adopt such an
interest-balancing inquiry explicitly.”).
86
Id. at 634–35 (majority opinion).
87
Id. at 635.
88
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
89
Id. at 3050.
90
Id. at 3043–44.
91
Id. at 3037.
92
Id. at 3048 (citations omitted).
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McDonald is important to consider because it struck down the
predecessor of the new Chicago Ordinance, which the Court determined
was similar to the law struck down in Heller.93 The law stated that “‘[n]o
person shall . . . possess . . . any firearm unless such person is the holder of
a valid registration certificate for such firearm.’”94 The law then
“prohibit[ed] registration of most handguns, thus effectively banning
handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside in the City.”95
The similarity between the laws struck down in Heller and McDonald is
important because the new Chicago Ordinance is the first legislative
response to a state law that has been struck down under the Second
Amendment.
III. DISCUSSION
Following Heller and McDonald, the City of Chicago amended its
code to comply with the rules laid out in those decisions. However, the
new Ordinance reads those opinions narrowly, restricting their meaning to
protect the exact question addressed: possession of firearms in the home.96
In doing so, the City of Chicago ignored the broader implications of Heller
and McDonald, which extend beyond the right of an individual to use
firearms for self-defense.97 By narrowly interpreting the meaning of the
Second Amendment, the City of Chicago’s newly approved Ordinance
continues to impermissibly restrict this fundamental right.
Applying the understanding of the Second Amendment established in
District of Columbia v. Heller, this Comment evaluates the new Chicago
Ordinance to determine which if any provisions remain in violation of the
Second Amendment. It will begin by focusing on the text of the Second
Amendment and two issues not addressed by the Heller decision. First, it
will address the meaning of the term “Arms”—focusing on whether use of
the plural form indicates more than one weapon and the term’s relation to
“the people”—and its implications for the Ordinance, which allows only
one operable firearm in the home. The Comment will then turn to the
meaning of “to bear Arms”—focusing on what qualifies as bearing arms—
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Id. at 3026.
Id. (alteration in original) (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040(a) (2009)).
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Id. (citing .CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-050(c) (2009)).
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CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040(a) (providing that it shall be “unlawful for any
person to carry or possess a handgun, except when in the person’s home”).
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See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“Americans understood
the ‘right of self-preservation’ as permitting a citizen to ‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the
intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an injury.’” (quoting 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *145 n.42)).
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and its implications for provisions of the Ordinance that prohibit carrying
firearms outside the home.
The Comment will then consider the purpose of “a well regulated
Militia” as understood by the Court in Heller and evaluate the likely effect
of that clause on provisions banning: (i) shooting galleries within the City
of Chicago; (ii) discharging a firearm in the city except in self-defense; and
(iii) carrying firearms outside the home.
A. THE CHICAGO ORDINANCE AND THE MEANING OF THE TERM
“ARMS”

The Second Amendment guarantees that “the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”98 In United States v. Heller,
the Supreme Court evaluated the meaning of this provision and determined
that it “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in
case of confrontation.”99 In finding the D.C. statute unconstitutional, the
Court placed particular emphasis on the importance of self-defense within
one’s home.100 After McDonald v. City of Chicago struck down Chicago’s
handgun law as unconstitutional, the city looked to the Heller decision for
guidance on how to redraft the ordinance.101 The Heller Court stated that
“the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy
choices off the table. These include the absolute prohibition of handguns
held and used for self-defense in the home.”102 Reading the mandate in
Heller narrowly, Chicago amended its firearm law, making it a crime to
have more than one firearm assembled and operable in a home at a given
time.103
This provision does not appear to violate the literal holding in Heller,
that a city cannot create an absolute prohibition against having or using a
gun for self-defense in the home. But it remains unclear whether the term
“Arms” indicates multiple weapons, as its pluralized form seems to
indicate, or whether “Arms” is a term of art meaning any single weapon.
The constitutionality of this prohibition turns on the answer to this question.
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U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
100
Id. at 635 (“And whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above
all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home.”).
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CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040 (explicitly stating that amendments to the handgun
statute were made in response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald).
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Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
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CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040 (“[E]very person who keeps or possesses a firearm
in his home shall keep no more than one firearm in his home assembled and operable.”).
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1. Support for a Singular Reading of “Arms”
One definition of “Arms” provided in Heller is “any thing that a man
wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or
strike another.”104 This definition, on its face, seems to suggest that “Arms”
can be read in the singular, as it refers to any “thing,” not “things.” Further,
“all firearms constituted ‘arms.’”105 This reading may support the singular
view, for if all firearms constitute arms, then any firearm, as an individual
thing, would constitute arms on its own.
Legislation enacted in the period before and after the Revolution
provides further support for the proposition that “Arms” may be used in the
singular. An Act for the Safeguard and Defence of the Country Against the
Indians, which was good law in Virginia in 1676, established death as the
punishment for the offense of trading “shot or arms” with the American
Indian population.106 “The act created an irrebutable presumption of such
trade for any person living in any Indian town . . . who possessed any arms
or ammunition other than one gun and ten charges of powder and shot.”107
Given that the right protected in the Second Amendment predates the
Constitution,108 the use of “Arms” as referring to a single gun in this context
indicates that “Arms” could be understood in its singular form.
Similarly, the 1792 Militia Act, passed into law by the second
Congress to provide for the adequate arming of the militia, stated that
“every citizen . . . shall . . . provide himself with a good musket or
firelock.”109 This early act of Congress, enacted less than a year after the
adoption of the Second Amendment, seems to indicate that a single musket
or firearm, in the common usage, was sufficient to qualify as “Arms” for
service within the militia.
Finally, in describing “the rights of Englishmen (which every
American colonist had been promised into perpetuity),”110 Blackstone’s
Commentaries from the 1760s stated that “everyone is at liberty to keep or
carry a gun.”111 These sources indicate that the pluralized term “Arms”
could be construed as a single weapon.
If that is an accurate
characterization, then the Chicago Ordinance’s limit of one ready-to-use
104

Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (quoting CUNNINGHAM, supra note 25, at 187) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
105
Id. (citations omitted).
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HALBROOK, supra note 12, at 56.
107
Id.
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Heller, 554 U.S. at 603.
109
1 Stat. 271 (1792).
110
Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What Did “Bear Arms” Mean in the
Second Amendment?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 511, 517 (2008).
111
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441.
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firearm in the home may be sufficient to satisfy the Second Amendment’s
requirement that firearms be allowed for defense in the home.
2. Support for a Plural Reading
According to Heller, the “Arms” protected by the Second Amendment
are those in common usage.112 To understand potential limitations on
quantity of arms possessed, it will be helpful to survey the arms in common
usage—i.e., the weapons an ordinary citizen would bring when the militia
was called to assemble—and evaluate whether there appeared to be any
limit on the number of arms possessed at the time of the Amendment’s
ratification. Since this survey demonstrates that citizens often possessed
more than one weapon,113 it suggests that the right to bear “Arms” in the
Second Amendment may protect the right of citizens to own and keep
operable multiple weapons.
To begin with, members of the Continental Congress were very clear
that it was the “[r]ight of every English subject to be prepared with
Weapons for his Defense,” using the plural of “weapon.”114 And while the
Militia Act of 1792 required all individuals to provide only a “musket or
firelock,”115 it required that members of the cavalry provide their own
“pistols and a sword,” which explicitly indicates two firearms and another
weapon.116 Additional support for this position can also be found in Heller,
which defines “‘arms’ as ‘[w]eapons of offence.’”117 Heller further states
that “[b]y arms, we understand those instruments of offense.”118
Another source cited in the Heller opinion, Cunningham’s A New and
Complete Law Dictionary, edited in 1771, defines arms as “any thing that a
man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast

112
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (“The term was applied, then as now, to weapons that
were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military
capacity.”).
113
See infra notes 114–29.
114
David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights,
4 J.L. & POL. 1, 29 (1987) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115
1 Stat. 271 (1792).
116
Hardy, supra note 114, at 27. While there are colorable arguments that modern
firearms would invalidate the need to protect the right to own multiple arms, determining
whether a functional equivalent of the Second Amendment is sufficient to satisfy its
guarantee is beyond the scope of this Comment, which contemplates the text of the
Amendment as it was understood upon ratification.
117
Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added) (citing 1 JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 106).
118
Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added) (quoting 1 JOHN TRUSLER,
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS ESTEEMED SYNONYMOUS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 37
(3d ed. 1794)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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at or strike another.”119 However, the term defined is “Armour or Arms,
(Arma).”120 The latin “arma” is likewise defined in the dictionary under the
phrase “Arma Libera,” which referred to the “sword and a lance which were
usually given to a servant, when he was made free.”121 In this sense,
“Arms” is once again given a plural definition in reference to the arms
borne by a single individual.
Other sources discussing the arms in common use—that is, arms that
would be borne for service in the militia at the time of the founding—also
indicate that more than one weapon fell under the definition of “bear
Arms.” In a measure considering grievances of Boston freeholders in 1768,
a number of items were considered, including one stating that “every listed
Soldier and other Householder (except Troopers, who by Law are otherwise
to be provided) shall always be provided with a well fix’d Firelock, Musket,
Accoutrements and Ammunition.”122
During the military occupation of Boston in 1775, the British
confiscated the arms of any colonist attempting to leave the city.123 This
effort resulted in the confiscation of a significant number of pistols, which
demonstrated the prevalence of pistols around the time of the revolution.124
Further, accounts from that period indicate that Americans found it
necessary “to carry with us some defensive weapons . . . a pair of
pistols.”125 Similarly, in a newspaper piece entitled An American Citizen,
Tench Coxe, a prominent Federalist writing in 1787–1788, discussed the
importance of the right to bear arms, describing “Arms” as “[t]heir swords,
and every other terrible implement of the soldier” as “the birth-right of an
American.”126
Finally, a 1744 New Jersey enactment demonstrates that the average
colonist was expected to own multiple weapons to fulfill his duties as part
of the militia.127 It stated that “[e]very person . . . shall be armed with a
good musket . . . and a bayonet fixed to it, a cutting sword or cutlace . . .
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Id. at 68 (quoting Tench Coxe, An American Citizen, PA. GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1788, in
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(Microform Supp.)).
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and shall keep at his Place of Abode . . . what is above mentioned.”128 It
further provided that “[e]ach horseman shall be provided with a good horse
. . . a Case of Pistols, a cutting sword . . . and shall keep at the Place of his
Abode, beside the Arms abovementioned, a well fix’d Carbine.”129
3. A Plural Reading Is More Faithful to the Original Understanding
On the balance of the evidence, it appears that while the technical
definition could be read in the singular, the arms in common usage at the
time—particularly the widespread use of pistols130—provide enough
examples of plural usage to indicate that “Arms” was not understood as
limited to a single firearm. This conclusion is further supported by the fact
that individuals were expected to provide more than a single weapon—a
pair of pistols and a sword for cavalrymen, a musket with a bayonet and a
sword for infantrymen—when called forth as part of the militia. As such, it
is likely that the framers of the Second Amendment understood the term
“Arms” to refer to the pluralized form of weapons that could be used for
self-defense or service in the militia.
4. Application to the Chicago Ordinance
In light of this understanding, the Chicago Ordinance, which allows
only one operable firearm in the home per licensed owner, should be found
unconstitutional.131 The term “Arms,” as understood at the time of the
Second Amendment’s ratification, was not limited to a single firearm, so
forbidding the possession of more than a single operable firearm likely
violates the meaning of that term. While modern firearms are significantly
more effective and easier to assemble than those in existence at the time of
ratification, the protections of the Second Amendment extend “to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in
existence at the time of the founding.”132 Thus, if the original Amendment
protected the right to own and have operable multiple firearms, advances in
technology are irrelevant to a textual understanding of what right is
protected.
Although it is true that the Ordinance allows owning more than a
single firearm, historical research and common sense indicate that arms
were expected to be kept in working order and ready for battle. The
original English right to bear arms was understood to require that
128
129
130
131
132

Id.
Id. at 44.
HALBROOK, supra note 12, at 59 n.24.
CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040 (2010).
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008).
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Englishmen were “bound to be ready, at all times” to use their arms in
defense of themselves and the realm.133 Indeed, the very notion of the
“minutemen” was that they would be ready, with functioning arms and
ammunition, to defend themselves and their province at a minute’s
notice.134 Further, at the time of the founding, it was well understood that
there was a “right of every English subject to be prepared with Weapons for
his Defense.”135
The nature of the arms borne at the time does not support an
understanding that only one could be kept operational at a time. For
example, if a cavalryman was called to action with his set of pistols, would
he be required to keep one unloaded and locked in the case until the other
had been discharged? This is a nonsensical interpretation of the right to
bear arms, given the arms in common usage at the time. Likewise, there is
no indication that civilian ownership of pistols would be subject to such a
provision. As such, it is unlikely that the Chicago Ordinance banning the
possession of more than one operational firearm at a time adequately
protects the scope of the right to bear “Arms.”
B. THE CHICAGO ORDINANCE AND THE PHRASE “BEAR ARMS”

1. Scope of the Right to Bear Arms
Heller has determined that the right to “keep Arms” protects, at the
least, the right to “have weapons.”136 It further determined that “to bear”
meant “to carry” at the time of the founding, and that “bearing Arms”
referred to carrying them for the purpose of confrontation.137 A question
not answered by Heller, however, was the place and manner in which an
individual was permitted to “bear Arms” for purposes of self-defense and
confrontation.
As Heller indicated, certain regulations on the place and manner in
which bearing arms would be permitted, such as regulations restricting
concealed carry and the carrying of arms in sensitive places, are not to be
disturbed by the decision.138 The Chicago Ordinance, however, has placed
severe restrictions on where arms may be carried for purposes of selfdefense. Section 8-20-020 of the Municipal Code of Chicago provides that
it shall be “unlawful for any person to carry or possess a handgun, except
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Cramer & Olson, supra note 110, at 515.
See HALBROOK, supra note 12, at 60.
Hardy, supra note 114, at 27, 29.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 582.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 626–27.
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when in the person’s home.”139 “Home” is defined as “the inside of a
person’s dwelling unit which is traditionally used for living purposes,
including the basement and attic,” but does not include “any garage, . . . any
space outside the dwelling unit, including any stairs, porches, back, side or
front yard spaces, or common areas[,] or . . . any dormitory, hotel, or group
living.”140
Reviewing the history of the right to keep and bear arms, it is clear that
limiting the right’s exercise to the confines of one’s apartment is an
unconstitutional limitation on that right. Beginning with the language in
Heller itself, the Court cites nine state constitutions establishing the right of
a citizen to “bear arms in defense of himself and the state” or citizens to
“bear arms in defense of themselves and the state.”141 As the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms in defense of both
an individual and the state, this must imply the ability to carry those arms
outside of one’s home. It is difficult to imagine how one could exercise the
right to bear arms in defense of the state from the confines of one’s living
room.
Further, Heller indicates that “to keep Arms” and “to bear Arms” have
separate meanings.142 Applying the canon of statutory construction that
each element of a statute should be given meaning,143 “bearing” cannot be
limited to carrying inside one’s home. If so, it would carry the same
meaning as “keep,” making the phrase redundant. To “keep Arms” refers to
the right to “possess arms,”144 which would presumably be done within the
confines of one’s home. Indeed, there is even evidence suggesting that the
right to “keep Arms” itself encompassed the right to use arms within the
home to oppose the entry of trespassers.145
The right to “bear Arms,” on the other hand, must extend to purposes
outside of the home. No application of the history of the Second
Amendment to its exercise can possibly warrant limiting the meaning of
“bear Arms” to carrying a weapon in one’s home. In Heller, the Court
discussed at length the possible motivations for the Amendment, which
could be anything from hunting to fighting off invasion to overthrowing a
139
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tyrannical central government.146 None of these uses can be accomplished
if the government can restrict the exercise of bearing arms to the confines of
one’s home.
This understanding is further supported by the history of the right to
bear arms, as “the intent of the state conventions that requested adoption of
a bill of rights and of the framers in Congress . . . was that the Second
Amendment recognize[] the absolute individual right to keep arms in the
home and to carry them in public.”147 Indeed, laws requiring that
individuals bear arms required that they be borne in public places.148 This
does not, of course, mean that the right to bear arms is unlimited, as the
Court in Heller acknowledged.149 Even a communal understanding of the
Second Amendment cannot limit the right to the home, as it is impossible to
bear arms for militia service if the weapon may not be carried outside the
home.
Finally, Blackstone’s Commentaries establish that “Americans
understood the ‘right of self-preservation’ as permitting a citizen to ‘repe[l]
force by force’ when ‘the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too
late to prevent an injury.’”150 Nothing in this understanding of the
fundamental rights of citizens implies that this right to self-preservation is
only available to those who stay home.
2. Application of Keep and Bear Arms to the Chicago Ordinance
Section 8-20-020 of the Municipal Code of Chicago makes it unlawful
to possess or carry a handgun outside of one’s home.151 While the Court
has stated that concealed carry laws are not disturbed by its decision in
Heller, it found the D.C. statute unconstitutional on the basis of its absolute
prohibition of the right to bear arms in self-defense within one’s home.152
By limiting the right to bear arms to the confines of one’s home, § 8-20-020
constitutes an absolute ban on the use of handguns for self-defense outside
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of one’s home.153 This understanding of the Second Amendment renders
the terms “keep” and “bear” identical, in contrast to the Court’s
interpretation in Heller and the canon of statutory interpretation that all
words in a statute must be given meaning. Finally, it conflicts with nearly
every purpose the Second Amendment was intended to achieve. In light of
these considerations, section 8-20-020 should be struck down as
unconstitutional.
C. THE CHICAGO ORDINANCE AND THE WELL-REGULATED MILITIA

1. Implications of the Prefatory Clause as Interpreted in Heller
The Prefatory Clause of the Second Amendment, “[a] well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,” confirms that the
right to bear arms cannot be limited to the home.154 The meaning of that
clause, as understood by the Supreme Court in Heller, also indicates that
several other provisions of the Chicago Ordinance will likely be struck
down as unconstitutional.
The natural right of self-defense155 applies not only to defense of the
individual, but also to the defense of society against tyranny.156 There was
little disagreement on this understanding at the time of the founding. 157 As
Hamilton put it, “[i]f the representatives of the people betray their
constituents, there is then no recourse left but in the exertion of that original
right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of
government.”158 It was universally agreed that the well-regulated militia
consisted of the entire general populace, which was to be armed and trained
in the use of arms. Indeed, that the people be well trained in the use of arms
was central to the founders’ understanding of the Second Amendment and
was considered the basic source of their liberty.159 As Madison put it, “[i]f
153
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the people [of Europe] were armed and organized into militia, ‘the throne of
every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the
legions which surround it.’”160
However, as the Prefatory Clause of the Amendment suggests, it was
equally important that the generalized militia be well regulated; that is, well
trained.161 The fear that led to the codification of this right was not just that
Congress could create either a select militia or standing army that would
exercise tyrannical control over the people, but that, in doing so, it would
endeavor to disarm the people through disuse of the generalized militia.162
Pointing to tactics utilized by pro-British strategists, George Mason
observed that “the best and most effectual way to enslave them . . . [was] by
totally disusing and neglecting the militia.”163 Indeed, if only Congress may
call up the militia, it has complete control over when and how the people
can train in the use of arms. It would be nonsensical to guarantee the right
to keep and bear arms as a final protection against tyranny, but then grant
the government complete control over the exercise of that right.164 The
importance of training was best stated by Richard Henry Lee, who argued
that “to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people
always possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to
use them.”165
2. Application of the Prefatory Clause to the Chicago Ordinance
When evaluating the relevance of the well-regulated militia to modern
society and its implications for the validity of statutory restrictions on the
Second Amendment, it is important to remember Heller’s insistence that
“[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood
to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or
(yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”166
In light of this history and the universal understanding that the
freedom of the polity depended upon the existence of a universal,167
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160
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properly trained militia, we evaluate several provisions of the Chicago
Ordinance (as the city initially amended it) to understand the intended scope
of the regulation. The provisions, when taken together, prohibited shooting
galleries,168 any sale of guns,169 and any discharge of a firearm within the
city limits, except in self-defense.170 This Section will show that, when
viewed in conjunction with the requirements that a resident must have a
Chicago firearm permit for each weapon in his possession171 and that
attaining such a permit requires at least one hour of range training,172 the
Chicago Ordinance—as originally amended173—constituted an absolute ban
on the exercise of the right to bear arms within the City of Chicago and
destroys the ability of the militia to remain lawfully well regulated without
leaving the city limits.
First, a statute forbidding the discharge of firearms within the city
limits infringes upon the ability of a militia to be trained and effective for
the defense of a free polity. The framers feared that the militia would be
disarmed through disuse.174 By banning the practice of marksmanship, the
City of Chicago disarms its local militia in precisely that manner.
Similarly, a complete ban on the sale of firearms within the city limits
infringes not only upon the right of the individual to arm himself for his
personal defense, but also upon the ability of the militia to arm itself. It is
true that Heller upheld the constitutionality of “laws imposing conditions
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”175 However, what the
Court clearly detests are regulations that constitute absolute bans upon the
ability of the people to exercise an explicitly enumerated fundamental
right.176
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This set of regulations also imposes an impermissible obstacle upon
the ability of an individual to exercise the precise right protected in Heller:
ownership and use of a firearm in one’s home for self-defense.177 A
resident of Chicago must attain a Chicago firearm permit, which requires at
least four hours of class instruction and one hour of range training.178
However, the Ordinance prohibits the very actions required to attain the
certification, since discharging a firearm within the city limits is prohibited
except in self-defense. Even if firearms were allowed to be discharged in
the city, the Ordinance initially banned the establishment of firing ranges,
which are the only places where certification can be safely accomplished.179
These prohibitions are not constitutionally justifiable on the grounds
that residents may receive training, buy their firearms, or practice with their
weapons elsewhere in Illinois. Just as Chicago could not ban the
fundamental right to protest within the city limits on the grounds that you
can protest outside the city,180 it cannot ban the exercise of an individual’s
fundamental right to keep and bear arms within the city limits.
IV. CONCLUSION
This analysis of Heller, the purpose behind the provisions of the
Second Amendment, and the Chicago Ordinance provide some general
guidelines as to what will and will not be permitted in regulating the “right
of the people to keep and bear Arms.” As was made clear in Heller,
absolute bans on the exercise of a fundamental right—such as Chicago’s
absolute ban on bearing arms outside the home or discharging arms in the
city—will fail constitutional muster under “any of the standards of scrutiny
that [the Justices] have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.”181
The major failing of the Chicago Ordinance is that it interpreted the
Court’s decision in Heller as limiting the Second Amendment to possession
of a handgun for self-defense in the home. In doing so, the city ignored the
Court’s embrace of significantly more than the particular holding
articulated and set itself up for a constitutional challenge. Legislatures
looking to craft legislation that will withstand scrutiny in the courts must
respect the three major themes underlying Heller and the implications for
the scope of the Second Amendment.
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First, there can be no absolute bans on the exercise of the fundamental
right of the people to keep and bear arms. This applies to each provision of
the Amendment. As such, the second takeaway is that the Second
Amendment protects the right to “bear Arms” as well as the right to “keep
Arms.” No reading of the Amendment’s ratification history can possibly
support the City of Chicago’s complete prohibition on carrying guns
outside of one’s home. Restricting the right to “bear Arms” to a person’s
abode not only renders it redundant with the right to “keep Arms,” but also
conflicts with the need for a well-regulated militia and the ability of the
people to exercise their fundamental right to self-defense—the core of the
Second Amendment.182
Finally, and perhaps less obviously in modern society, it is important
to recognize the historical justification for the codification of this preexisting, fundamental right within the Constitution. As the Court
recognized in Heller, the “right of the people to keep and bear Arms” was
necessary not only to preserve the security of the individual within his
home, but also to secure the freedom of the polity from all foes—including
the tyranny of a strong, centralized government.183 At ratification, “[i]t was
understood across the political spectrum that the right helped to secure the
ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive
military force if the constitutional order broke down.”184 When regulators
lose sight of this purpose, and interpret the right too narrowly—as the City
of Chicago did in adopting the Responsible Gun Ownership Ordinance—
they legislate against the rights enshrined in the Second Amendment.
Legislators who keep these three principles in mind will be able to craft
effective, constitutional legislation and avoid the founders’ dire fear that
they “may now surrender, with a little ink, what it may cost seas of blood to
regain.”185
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